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I 
INTRODUCTION 
There are two divergent paths for Truth and Reconciliation processes: one toward 
seeking truth, giving voice to the voiceless, comforting the downtrodden and 
confronting the powers that be. The other path is toward avoiding confrontation, 
muting dissent, glossing over differences, appealing to the broadest possible cultural 
base and ultimately excusing injustice in the name of reconciling the community while 
supporting the status quo and those powers that depend on it. . . . Among the 
questions we must ask ourselves is from whom do we seek legitimacy—The grassroots 
or the establishment. The tendency of popular culture is to seek legitimacy from those 
in power. This will tend to nullify the process of seeking the truth.1 
This article provides a brief background on the Greensboro Truth and 
Community Reconciliation process and the event it was created to address. It 
will then apply some of the lessons described in Professor Gibson’s article2 to 
the process in Greensboro by exploring these questions: (1) Who were the 
victims in Greensboro and what role did they or should they have played in the 
truth and reconciliation process? (2) How can an institution have broad 
legitimacy in a community with such low levels of trust? (3) What is 
reconciliation and has it occurred in Greensboro? Although Gibson offers 
much valuable advice for building effective truth and reconciliation 
commissions (TRCs), some of his advice is contingent on the perceived goals of 
the TRC, while other advice can prove counterproductive. 
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 1. ED WHITFIELD, LESSONS FROM THE GREENSBORO, NC, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
PROCESS 1 (2006). 
 2. James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions, 72 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (Spring 2009). 
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II 
BACKGROUND 
On November 3, 1979, Klansmen and American Nazis confronted a group 
of anti-Klan demonstrators at a march organized by the Communist Workers 
Party3 in an African American public-housing project in Greensboro, North 
Carolina.4 Even though the demonstrators had received a parade permit5 and 
the police department, through its paid informant, knew of the Klansmen and 
Nazis’ plans to disrupt the march,6 there was no visible police presence when the 
white supremacists shot and killed five organizers and wounded ten others.7 
Although the shootings were captured on film by four news crews on the scene, 
all-white juries acquitted the shooters of all charges in state and federal criminal 
trials.8 In a third, federal civil trial, though, the jury found the shooters as well as 
two Greensboro police officers and the Klan informant jointly liable for the 
wrongful death of one victim.9 On behalf of the defendants, the City of 
Greensboro paid nearly $400,000 in damages to the victim’s widow and two 
injured protesters, but never acknowledged any wrongdoing .10 
Over twenty years later, a group of Greensboro residents and other 
concerned individuals—including former Communist Workers Party members 
who had witnessed their loved ones killed that day—recognized that the issues 
Greensboro was facing in 2000—including institutional racism, poor working 
conditions and opportunities, and distrust between the police department and 
African American communities—mirrored the historical context that led to the 
tragic events of 1979.11 A former Greensboro mayor confirmed that, during her 
 
 
 4. Administrative Report from the Greensboro Police Dep’t 7 (Nov. 19, 1979). 
 5. Application for a Parade Permit from the Greensboro Police Dep’t (Oct. 19, 1979) (witnessed 
and signed by Captain Larry Gibson). 
 6. Greensboro Police Dep’t Internal Affairs Dep’t Report, “Planning Activities for the Anti-Klan 
March Scheduled November 3, 1979” from D.C. Williams to Chief William Swing (Dec. 7, 1979); 
Nelson Johnson, Statement to the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Comm’n’s Public Hearing 
(Aug. 26, 2005); Interview by the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Comm’n with Larry Gibson, 
Captain, Greensboro Police Dep’t, in Sanford, N.C. (May 5, 2006). 
 7. Id. 
 8. In the State trial, the jury could have found the defendants guilty of first-degree murder, 
second-degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter; they chose to acquit on all charges. Federal 
prosecutors chose to charge the shooters using Title 18 of the U.S. Criminal Code § 245 (part of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act), which required that the prosecutors prove that the shooters acted out of racial animus. 
If the prosecutors had chosen to use § 241, they would have had to prove government involvement, but 
not racial animus. GREENSBORO TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 286 
(2006), available at http://www.greensborotrc.org [hereinafter GTRC REPORT] (discussing State v. 
Fowler, No. CR-83-53-G (M.D.N.C. 1980)). 
 9. GTRC REPORT, supra note 8, at 305 (citing Waller v. Butkovich, No. CV-80-605-G (M.D.N.C. 
1985)). 
 10. Agreement and Release accompanying Order, Waller v. Butkovich (Nov. 5, 1985). 
 11. For more information on how these issues were related to the events of November 3, 1979, see 
GTRC REPORT, supra note 8. Of particular relevance are the first two chapters: “From Black Power to 
Multicultural Organizing” and “Labor and Unions in North Carolina’s Textile Mills.” 
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tenure, discussions surrounding issues of police–community trust nearly always 
got bogged down when the divisive topic of November 3, 1979, was inevitably 
raised.12 By establishing a more accurate collective memory of what happened, 
they reasoned, the community would better understand how to move forward.13 
The concerned citizens created the Greensboro Truth and Community 
Reconciliation Project, which adapted the TRC model used in South Africa, 
Peru, and dozens of other countries around the world. Unlike any of these 
commissions, however, the Greensboro commission (GTRC) was grassroots-
initiated rather than government-sponsored. Furthermore, the GTRC had no 
subpoena power or power to grant amnesty. Like the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (SATRC), the GTRC conducted its research and 
community outreach by taking private statements, holding public hearings, and 
conducting documentary research. It then released its findings and 
recommendations in a written final report.14 
III 
WHO WERE THE VICTIMS IN GREENSBORO AND WHAT ROLE DID OR 
SHOULD THEY HAVE PLAYED IN THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
PROCESS? 
Responses to the truth process in Greensboro—like responses to the 1979 
events themselves—were divided. Many opponents pointed to the role that the 
victims—demonstrators who generally refer to themselves as survivors and who 
were directly connected to those injured and killed that day—played in the 
establishment of the GTRC as evidence of its inevitable bias. But, with the 
creation of the Mandate15 and by the selection process for the GTRC itself, the 
survivors and other members of the Greensboro Truth and Community 
Reconciliation Project created a commission that was independent.16 
 
 12. Interview by Carolyn Allen with the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in 
Greensboro, N.C., 2005. 
 13. A portion of the GTRC’s mandate included the following explanation: “There comes a time in 
the life of every community when it must look humbly and seriously into its past in order to provide the 
best possible foundation for moving into a future based on healing and hope. Many residents of 
Greensboro believe that for this city, the time is now.” MANDATE FOR THE GREENSBORO TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 1 (2003), available at http://www.greensborotrc.org/mandate.doc 
[hereinafter GTRC MANDATE]. 
 14. The final report as well as detailed information about the work and origin of the GTRC is 
available at http://www.greensborotrc.org. 
 15. See GTRC MANDATE, supra note 13, at 2 (“The Commission will carry out its mandate while 
operating independently from any external influence, including the Project. It may reach cooperative 
agreements with organizations, institutions and individuals in order to strengthen its capacity and 
resources, in [] so [] far as such agreements do not compromise the Commission’s independence. The 
Commission will have full authority to make decisions on its spending, within the limits of available 
funds, and may elect to have a fiscal sponsor through another institution so long as that relationship is 
consistent with the spirit of the mandate and the Commission’s substantive independence.”). 
 16. The selection process, along with the entire truth process, was conducted in close consultation 
with the International Center for Transitional Justice. The selection panel for the Commission was 
made up of representatives from fourteen different groups in Greensboro including mainstream white 
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Unlike SATRC’s mandate, which clearly defined the victims,17 GTRC’s 
Mandate used the term “victim” only once, in reference to one of the five 
people killed.18 Further complicating GTRC’s task of defining a group of victims 
was its mandate to examine the “context, causes, sequence and consequence of 
the events of November 3, 1979.”19 After much discussion, the GTRC decided to 
define those harmed (without using the term “victim”) as follows: 
Our recommendations seek to address the direct harm of those who were killed, 
wounded or psychologically traumatized, as well as what we believe were indirect 
harms suffered by groups including[] 
• residents of the City of Greensboro, which lost ground on human relations 
progress made after school desegregation; 
• relatives and associates of both CWP demonstrators and Klan-Nazi shooters, who 
were stigmatized and suffered various forms of backlash; 
• progressive grassroots organizers whose work was made more difficult by such 
processes as red-baiting; 
• mill workers and other low-income residents who would have been beneficiaries 
of more successful organizing for racial and economic justice.20 
In his article, James Gibson cautions, “Those directly engaged in the 
struggle are often ‘spoilers’ in transitional politics, making the necessary 
compromises more difficult to achieve. . . . [They must therefore be given] 
incentives to . . . disengage from the transformation process so that 
reconciliation efforts can be focused on the majority in the society.”21 But 
without those “directly engaged in the struggle,” there would be no 
reconciliation effort.22 In Greensboro, as in South Africa, the post-transition 
 
church leaders, black church leaders, Muslim and Jewish leaders, college and university leaders, 
neighborhood associations, the local Democratic and Republican parties, and the Mayor’s office. Also 
invited, but declining, to appoint someone to the selection panel were the Greensboro Police 
Department, the Sons of the Confederacy and Daughters of the Confederacy, and the Greensboro 
Chamber of Commerce. This panel accepted more than seventy nominations from the Greensboro 
community and ultimately selected seven commissioners to serve on the GTRC. SELECTION PROCESS 
FOR THE GREENSBORO TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2005), available at www. 
greensborotrc.org/selection_process.php. 
 17. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act established the SATRC and defined 
“victim” as 
a) persons who, individually or together with one or more persons, suffered harm in the 
form of physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a substantial 
impairment of human rights . . . (i) as a result of a gross violation of human rights; or (ii) 
as a result of an act associated with a political objective for which amnesty has been 
granted; (b) persons who, individually or together with one or more persons, suffered 
harm in the form of physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a 
substantial impairment of human rights, as a result of such person intervening to assist 
persons contemplated in paragraph (a) who were in distress or to prevent victimization of 
such persons; and (c) such relatives or dependants of victims as may be prescribed. 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 s. xix. 
 18. See GTRC MANDATE, supra note 13. 
 19. Id. 
 20. GTRC REPORT, supra note 8, at 383. 
 21. Gibson, supra note 2, at 126. 
 22. Nelson Mandela, for example, both was directly engaged in the struggle against apartheid in 
South Africa and initiated the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
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truth and reconciliation efforts were initially driven by survivors. The efforts to 
implement the GTRC’s recommendations were driven, as they had been in 
South Africa, by these survivors, along with an expanded body of concerned 
citizens. If successful in Greensboro, Gibson’s proposed incentives for these 
survivors to disengage from the truth and reconciliation process would have 
significantly weakened efforts to implement the GTRC’s recommendations. 
Without the survivors driving the implementation of the recommendations, the 
“bystanders” would have had no sense of urgency about implementation, and 
the GTRC’s report would largely have been forgotten. Gibson’s 
recommendation would likely create similar difficulties for many social 
conflicts. 
IV 
HOW CAN AN INSTITUTION HAVE BROAD LEGITIMACY IN A DIVIDED 
COMMUNITY WITH EXTREMELY LOW LEVELS OF TRUST?23 
Once appointed by a selection panel representing diverse community 
stakeholders, the GTRC struggled to establish itself as a legitimate institution in 
a community with already-low levels of trust. The GTRC found both support 
and opposition within all local demographic groups. Individuals’ reasons for 
their support and opposition, however, differed depending on race and, to a 
lesser extent, class. In a door-to-door campaign, GTRC staff, commissioners, 
and volunteers spoke with hundreds of community members about the events 
and context of 1979 and the truth and reconciliation process. 
In white neighborhoods, canvassers reported that the community members 
who opposed the truth commission did so because they saw the events of 1979 
as being virtually disconnected from the city. These white residents often talked 
about how the groups involved came from outside the community (an assertion 
later corrected by the GTRC’s report) and had nothing to do with Greensboro. 
Even if racism was a problem in 1979, they reasoned, these problems no longer 
existed. With this attitude, these residents thought the events of November 3, 
1979, were better left in the past. But other white residents supported the 
GTRC process and its efforts at racial reconciliation, often because they 
perceived that clear racial divisions remained in Greensboro. 
In black, usually working-class and poor neighborhoods, opponents to the 
process (including those who were privately supportive, but would not 
participate or support it publicly) expressed a few different reasons for their 
opposition or reluctance to participate. Many expressed fear that participation 
in or support of the process could bring retaliation in the form of violence or 
intimidation from the police, the Klan, employers, or the housing authority. 
Others lacked hope that such a process could lead to improvement in their own 
lives. And still others reported that in their struggles to make ends meet at 
 
 23. Unless otherwise cited, the observations in the next two sections were drawn from the 
experiences of GTRC staff, including the author of this article. 
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home, they had no time to participate in such a process. Those in the black 
neighborhoods who supported the truth and reconciliation process typically 
talked about the need for truth in general, and a true understanding of the 
events of 1979 in particular. 
These differences in opinion played out in a public way when GTRC 
supporters presented Greensboro’s city council with 5300 signatures on a 
petition calling for the council to endorse the GTRC. The petition sought 
neither funding nor the council’s prior endorsement of the GTRC’s findings and 
recommendations. After hours of deliberation in public and in private, the 
council members voted six to three—with the six white members, including the 
mayor, voting against the three black members—to officially oppose the truth 
and reconciliation program. Interestingly, one white council member reported 
that her opposition to the process grew out of her belief that racial divisions no 
longer existed in Greensboro. 
The GTRC nonetheless ultimately found that its legitimacy in the 
community was not significantly undermined by the vote. Although some 
residents may have seen the council’s opposition as a red flag challenging the 
GTRC’s legitimacy, others saw the council’s opposition as a sign that the GTRC 
was truly independent of the institution that many blamed at least partially for 
the 1979 events. Indeed, many residents from all backgrounds who might have 
been on the fence about the relevance of the process saw the council’s racially 
divided vote as a sign that Greensboro clearly did have racial divisions that 
needed to be addressed. 
As Gibson predicts, the perception among a critical mass of Greensboro 
residents of the GTRC’s legitimacy was a crucial issue. But in Greensboro, a 
city divided in part because of different experiences and memories of events 
like those on November 3, 1979, the GTRC could have spent all of its time 
promoting itself as a fair, legitimate institution and still not have made much 
headway. Although the GTRC did attempt to engage the community in a way 
that reflected its intention to be fair and evenhanded, the commission decided 
on numerous occasions to focus on producing a report that reflected as many 
different voices as possible and that was well-supported by sound research. 
Although Gibson’s recommendations about the need of truth commissions 
to be perceived as legitimate seem obvious enough, experience in Greensboro 
leads me to believe that because truth commissions generally work under strict 
deadlines, it is important for them to weigh their decisions carefully about how 
much time to spend managing public perceptions of their credibility. Given the 
GTRC’s limited resources in terms of time and personnel, the urge to respond 
individually to the numerous accusations of bias could have resulted in a less-
well-documented and less-evenhanded report, had that urge been left 
unchecked. 
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V 
WHAT IS RECONCILIATION AND HAS IT OCCURRED IN GREENSBORO? 
Since the GTRC’s report was released, many Greensboro residents and 
observers have asked if the process was successful and whether Greensboro is 
now “reconciled.” Views differ, and the differences follow racial lines. Some 
residents of Greensboro—usually white—tend to define reconciliation in terms 
of increased trust in relationships across previous lines of conflict and division. 
To these residents, the notions of forgiveness (and, less often, apology) tend to 
be primary in determining the success of the process. Although there were a 
few notable moments during the truth process in which apologies and 
forgiveness were offered, this group tends to assume that Greenboro’s truth and 
reconciliation process was not successful. 
Other residents—usually those most negatively and directly affected by the 
context and events of November 3, 1979—see the first step of reconciliation in 
terms of institutional reform. Based on its findings about that context and those 
events, the GTRC made recommendations about reforms in local, county, and 
state government, including a living wage for city employees and contractors, 
and establishing a citizens’ review board over the police department. The 
GTRC made recommendations about the public school system, as well, 
including incorporating the events and context of November 3, 1979, into the 
local history curriculum, and about the local media, including a call for more 
coverage of the context of local conflicts. 
For this latter group, the question of whether the truth process in 
Greensboro was successful remains unanswered. It is clear that, when reporting 
on the 1979 events and the GTRC process, most local media outlets report the 
facts more accurately now than they did prior to the report’s release. Similarly, 
Greensboro residents, as evidenced in part in local blogs, discuss the 1979 
events with a more accurate understanding of the facts. Furthermore, although 
the local government has largely avoided much serious discussion of the GTRC 
report, community groups have taken up some of the GTRC’s 
recommendations and are currently working to get them implemented. 
Reconciliation probably includes elements of both increased trust across 
lines of difference and reformation of the institutions that have allowed an 
injustice to occur in the first place. No one in Greensboro would argue that the 
community is fully reconciled at this point. Some might argue that the city is 
even more divided than it was prior to the truth and reconciliation process. But 
the divisions are not new. Greensboro’s truth and reconciliation process and 
other, more-current events in the city have merely made some residents more 
aware of the divide, largely along lines of race and class, which existed long 
before 1979. Time will tell if a better understanding of what led to that division 
will contribute to a process of healing for Greensboro. 
 
